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Consumers often purchase more than one differentiated product, assembling a portfolio,
which might potentially affect substitution patterns of demand and, as a consequence,
oligopolistic firms’ pricing strategies. To study such consumers’ portfolio considera-
tions, this paper develops and estimates a structural model that allows for flexible
complementarities/substitutabilities, using Japanese household-level data on automo-
bile purchases. My estimates suggest that complementarities arise when households
purchase a combination of one small automobile and one minivan as their portfolio.
Simulation results suggest that, due to such portfolio considerations, a policy proposal
of repealing the current tax subsidies for small eco-friendly automobiles would not nec-
essarily sharply decrease the demand.
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In many differentiated product markets, such as the markets for automobiles and personal
computers, consumers often purchase more than one product. For instance, the U.S. De-
partment of Transportation reports more than 55% of U.S. households owned more than one
automobile in 2000. In such situations, consumers typically choose several different prod-
ucts rather than multiple units of an identical product, assembling a portfolio that meets
their specific needs. For example, a married couple with two children might purchase one
compact sedan to commute to work on the weekdays and one minivan to go camping on the
weekends, instead of two midsize sedans. This illustrative example suggests that because of
the complementarity between some products the utility from such a portfolio of products
might not simply be the sum of the products’ individual utilities, though most of the existing
literature ignores such effects. In this paper, I call the extra utility that a household derives
from purchasing combinations of products the “portfolio effect.”1
This portfolio effect potentially plays an important role for evaluating government policies
or examining firms’ strategies which promote the consumption of particular types of prod-
ucts. For example, in the automotive industry, governments might subsidize fuel-efficient
automobiles. Then, a household planning to purchase a midsize sedan and a minivan might
instead purchase one compact car, which is eligible for the subsidy, and one slightly larger
and more luxurious minivan than it was expected to purchase. The subsidy could therefore
lead to an unintended consequence, because larger automobiles tend to be less fuel-efficient.
This paper develops an empirical framework for estimating a market equilibrium model
that incorporates portfolio effects in consumer demand explicitly, building upon previous
models considered by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (1995) (hereafter BLP) and Gentzkow
(2007). In the model, there are two types of agents – consumers and firms. Consumers max-
imize utility by choosing one or two products, subject to a budget constraint. They can also
choose to purchase nothing. Each product is characterized by a bundle of characteristics,
and consumers derive utility from these characteristics. When they purchase two products,
consumers may potentially derive an extra utility – the portfolio effect – depending on house-
hold attributes and product types. As suggested by the data, I introduce portfolio effects
that vary by the product categories. I divide the set of automobiles into three categories
(i.e., small cars, regular cars and minivans) and assume that consumers obtain the same
1In single discrete choice models, all choices are restricted a priori to be perfect substitutes. Moreover,
even allowing for purchasing two products, such patterns cannot be generated unless the model takes into
account the portfolio effects.
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portfolio effect for any set of two automobiles that belong to the same respective categories.
The supply side follows BLP where oligopolistic multi-product firms simultaneously set the
prices for their products to maximize profits, taking into account the pricing strategies of
other firms.
I apply the framework to the Japanese automobile market and estimate the model, draw-
ing on various sources of information including individual-level data on purchasing decisions,
in addition to macro-level data on market shares. Newly collected data from the Keio House-
hold Panel Survey (KHPS) provides household-level data on annual automobile purchasing
decisions, as well as basic household demographics, for 4,005 representative Japanese house-
holds. This micro-level dataset enables me to relate household attributes to the characteris-
tics of purchased products and to identify the value of joint ownership of different categories
of automobiles. I estimate the model by minimizing the distance between the empirical
moments derived from the individual-household level data and the moments predicted by
the model, as developed by Petrin (2002) and applied by Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (2004)
(hereafter micro-BLP). The estimation results show that there exists a positive portfolio ef-
fect between small cars and minivans. The estimates also indicate that households are more
likely to purchase two automobiles as their number of income earners increases and if they
are located in rural areas. These results immediately lead to the following question: Would
ignoring portfolio effects lead to a biased counterfactual analysis?
I use the estimated structural model to simulate the effect of eliminating the current tax
subsidies for small automobiles (commonly known in Japan as kei-cars).2 In Japan, among
households who purchase more than one automobile, more than half purchase at least one
kei-car. The popularity of kei-cars is partially due to government tax subsidies that were
introduced in the 1960s to make small cars more affordable for Japanese households, and
that currently promote ownership of environmentally-friendly small cars. In recent years,
there has been debate about repealing these tax subsidies. The opposition claims that the
demand for fuel efficient kei-cars would dramatically decrease, which would have detrimental
impact on the environment. However, if there is a positive portfolio effect between kei-cars
and other types of cars, then those households who purchase one minivan and one kei-car
under the current tax scheme might maintain their portfolios by purchasing more affordable
minivans and kei-cars after the subsidies are repealed. As a consequence, the demand for
kei-cars might not decrease as sharply, i.e., the environmental effect of the repeal of tax
2A kei-car is the smallest automobile classification in Japan. To be classified as a kei-car, an automobile
must have an engine displacement of less than 660cc, and its exterior width, height, and length must be less
than 4.86 ft., 6.56 ft., and 11.15 ft., respectively.
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subsidies for small kei-cars might be limited.
This economic intuition is verified by the following two sets of simulation results. First
of all, my model (hereinafter the portfolio-BLP model) predicts that the total demand for
kei-cars would decrease by 9.0% and the total demand for other automobiles would increase
by 3.9%. On the other hand, a standard single choice model, the micro-BLP model, predicts
that the total demand for kei-cars would decrease by 14.0% and the demand for other auto-
mobiles would increase by 5.8%. Thus, by ignoring portfolio effects, the effects of repealing
tax subsidies are overstated. Secondly, the portfolio-BLP model predicts that the demand for
affordable minivans would increase and that for expensive minivans would decrease slightly.
On the other hand, the micro-BLP model predicts that the demand for both types of mini-
vans would increase. These two sets of results imply that some households highly value
a combination of one kei-car and one minivan, and those households would purchase one
kei-car and one relatively cheap minivan to maintain the benefits from their portfolios under
the new tax policy.
In the interest of examining the environmental implications of allowing for the portfolio
effect, I calculate the harmonic average of fuel efficiency of automobiles, which is commonly
known as Corporate Average Fuel Efficiency (CAFE) Standards Index. Though both models
predict a slight decrease in average fuel efficiency, the portfolio-BLP model still predicts
higher average fuel efficiency than the micro-BLP model, implying that the environmental
implications might be also overstated in the micro-BLP model. This difference between the
predictions from two models can be explained by the same logic; some households giving
up purchasing huge minivans and purchasing affordable minivans instead contribute to the
higher average fuel efficiency, whereas this cannot happen in the micro-BLP model.3 As
a corollary of this result, when a government provides more subsidies for purchasing eco-
friendly automobiles, we might not always be able to achieve the intended goal due to the
portfolio effect.
2 The Model
Consider a differentiated product market. Each product is indexed by j, j = 1, 2, · · · , J ,
and is expressed as a bundle of characteristics, such as horsepower and fuel efficiency. Let pj
and xj denote the price and other characteristics of automobile j, respectively. As a matter
of convention, let j = 0 denote the outside good, i.e., purchasing no products. This charac-
3 Among the studies of implications for the incident of environmental taxes, West (2004) also emphasize
the importance of household heterogeneity.
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teristic approach is commonly employed in estimating discrete choice models, especially in
studies of the automotive industry, such as BLP, Bresnahan (1987), and Goldberg (1995).
This paper uses a BLP-type random coefficients model.
There are two types of agents: consumers and producers. I describe the consumers’ and
producers’ maximization problems in the following sections.
2.1 Household Behavior
Let i = 1, 2, · · · , N denote the individual households. Each household is characterized by its
observed characteristics, (yi,zi), where yi denotes the income of households and zi denotes
other household characteristics such as such as family size, age of the household head, number
of kids and so on. In the model, I assume that each household purchases up to two automo-
biles. Let di = (di1, di2) denote an automobile purchase decision for household i, where each
dik specifies the product, i.e., dik = 0, 1, · · · , J for k = 1, 2. The households maximize their
utilities by choosing automobile purchases and levels of non-automobile consumption goods,
C. Namely, each household i solves the following maximization problem;
max
C,(j,l)
uc(C)uai (j, l) s.t. C + p
c(pj; τ ) + p
c(pl; τ ) ≤ yi,
with
uc(C) = Cα, and log(uai (j, l)) = uij + uil + Γ(j, l; z
c
i ) + εi,(j,l),
where pj is the price that firms charge for automobile j, p
c(pj; τ ) is the after-tax price for
automobile j that consumers must pay under tax scheme τ , uai is the utility from automobile
consumption, which could be different for each household even if they choose the same
automobiles, and uc is the utility from non-automobile consumption.4 This functional form
is a Cobb-Douglas utility function in automobile and non-automobile consumption. I assume
that the log of utility from automobile consumption is the sum of the following components;
(i) the utilities from each automobile consumption, uij and uil, (ii) an interaction term
between two automobiles which I call the portfolio effect, Γ(j, l; zci ), and (iii) idiosyncratic
individual preference shock, εi,(j,l), assumed to be independent of the product characteristics
and of each other. In the following section, I explain the utilities from each automobile
consumption and the portfolio effect term.
4To keep the notation for prices simple, I use pj instead of p
c(pj ; τ ) in this section, and will introduce
detailed automobile taxes in Section 6.
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Utility from Single Automobile Consumption For each automobile consumption, a
household derives the following utility;
uij = xjβ
′
i + ξj =
M∑
m=1
xjmβim + ξj, (1)
with








where xj = [xj1, · · · , xjM ] and ξj represent the observed and unobserved characteristics for
product j respectively, βi = [βi1, · · · , βiM ] denotes household i’s valuation for each prod-
uct characteristic, zpi = [z
p
i1, · · · , z
p
iR] and νi represent observed and unobserved household
attributes, assumed to follow standard normal distributions. Furthermore, I interact these
evaluations for each automobile’s characteristics with household attributes. βo and βu de-
note the coefficients for the observable and unobservable household attributes.
One key feature of this specification is that each household is able to have a different
valuation for each product. Moreover, even if the household characteristics are the same, it
is still possible for them to have different valuations for each product. For example, as the
household size increases, the household’s valuation of seating capacity might increase. This
trend will be captured by βo. Such parameters are identified by adding micro-level moments,
as developed by Petrin (2002) and applied by micro-BLP. Moreover, it is still possible to
have different valuations due to the unobserved household heterogeneity, νim, which is the
last term in equation (2).
Portfolio Effects The most straightforward way to capture portfolio effects between two
automobiles is by defining them pair-wise, i.e., defining them for each possible combination
of j and l. It is, however, almost impossible to estimate these pair-wise portfolio effects due
to difficulties in computation and identification. Motivated by the data which shows that
households are interested in owning particular combinations of different types of automobiles,
such as one sedan and one minivan (and not one specific sedan and one specific minivan),
I introduce category-wise portfolio effects. I categorize automobiles into three mutually
exclusive sets, the set of kei -cars denoted by K, the set of regular cars denoted by R, and
the set of minivans denoted by M. I assume that the portfolio effect is the same for all
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automobiles in the same category:
Γ(j, l; zci ) =

ΓKK , if (j, l) ∈ (K ×K)
ΓKR, if (j, l) ∈ (K ×R) ∪ (R×K)
ΓKM , if (j, l) ∈ (K ×M) ∪ (M×K)
ΓRR, if (j, l) ∈ (R×R)
ΓRM , if (j, l) ∈ (R×M) ∪ (M×R)
ΓMM , if (j, l) ∈ (M×M)
0, otherwise.
This classification can be viewed as the passenger capacities of the automobiles, because the
average passenger capacity of kei-cars, regular cars, and minivans are four, five, and seven
respectively.5 Moreover, it is also possible to include the difference of capacities between
the two automobiles in the portfolio effect. However, this method offers too little variation,
because the seating capacities do not vary enough and even considering the difference there
is insufficient variation to estimate the coefficient. That it why I introduce the category-wise
portfolio effect in this particular estimation. There are other possible ways to categorize
automobiles, e.g., I can categorize them by engine displacement or horsepower. I discuss
this issue in Section 4.
Moreover, I impose the following parametric assumption on the functional form of the






il + ζr, for r = KK,KR,KM,RR,RM,MM,
where zci = [z
c
i1, · · · , zciL] are the household i’s attributes that affect the portfolio effect,
γr = [γr1, · · · , γrL] are the combination-specific coefficients vectors for the household char-
acteristics, and ζr is the combination specific unobserved term for combination r. The first
term captures any patterns of holding a particular combination which might be driven by a
particular household’s attributes. For example, if the household includes any children, the
choice probabilities for combinations which include one minivan are typically high. It cap-
tures such trends. For some characteristics, l̂, I restrict γrl̂ ≡ γl̂ for all r, in order to capture
the pure effect of having two automobiles, because such l̂ does not depend any particular
combination of automobiles. The second term, the combination specific unobserved terms
ζr, play a similar role to that of the unobserved characteristics for each product, ξj.
5See Table 1.
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There are three alternative approaches in the literature. Each approach needs to assume
two differentiated products ex-ante are either substitutes as in Hendel (1999), Dube (2004),
and Fan (2010), independent as in Augereau, Greenstein and Rysman (2006), or complements
as in Manski and Sherman (1980) and Train, McFadden and Ben-Akiva (1987).67 However,
Gentzkow (2007), who studies the complementarities among print and online newspapers,
allows for more flexibility in the sense that the two differentiated products could be sub-
stitutes, independent, or complements. Therefore, this paper extends Gentzkow (2007)’s
method, allowing the portfolio effect to depend on household attributes in order to obtain
flexible complementarity patterns, which are likely of importance in the empirical setting.
Portfolio Effects vs. Complementarities In Gentzkow (2007), as his model assumes a
quasi-linear utility function which has no income effects, the sign of Γ implies whether two
products are complements, independent, or substitutes. However, as this model assumes a
Cobb-Douglas utility function, which has an income effect, the sign of Γ cannot be interpreted
straightforwardly; even though the portfolio effect term for a particular combination of two
automobiles is positive, it could be possible that these two products are complements. To
see this point, consider the market with two products j and l. The condition for judging the
relationship between two products is given by
Γ(j, l; zci ) ⪌ α log
[
(yi − pj)(yi − pl)
yi(yi − pj − pl)
]
. (3)
If Γ(j, l) is greater than the right hand side, it means that these two products are com-
plements. If equality holds, then the two products are independent. Otherwise, they are
substitutes. More importantly, the right hand side should be a positive number for any
income level, as (yi−pj)(yi−pl)/[yi(yi−pj−pl)] > 1. Therefore, Γ > 0 does not nessessarily
mean that two products are complements. Moreover, condition (3) also tells us that the
determinant of complementarities/substitutabilities largely depends on the magnitude of in-
come relative to the automobile prices. As income level yi becomes relatively large compared
to pj and pl, the right hand side approaches zero, as in the Gentzkow (2007) model.
Although condition (3) enables us to judge whether each combination of products are
complements, substitutes, or independent, the goal of this paper is to examine the role portfo-
6For more comprehensive discussion, see Gentzkow (2007).
7 I also build on Manski and Sherman (1980) who allow consumers to purchase two automobiles, but as-
sume that any two automobiles are complements. Instead, I allow for flexible portfolio effects, not restricting
them to be complementarities ex-ante and allowing them to vary by household attributes and automobile
categories.
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lio effects play in the demand structure and counterfactual experiments. Therefore, I will use
this portfolio effect term notation instead of translating them into complements/substitutes.
Choice Probabilities Substituting (2) into (1) and plugging them into the original maxi-






















For notational simplicity, let δj denote the mean utility derived from product j, which is the
same for every household, and µij = µ(xj,β,νi,zi) denote the remaining part, excluding
εij. When a household chooses the outside option, it obtains δ0 = 0 and µi0 = α ln(yi).
Assuming that ε follows a Type I extreme value distribution, the probability of choosing
products j and l conditional on household i’s attributes, all product characteristics, and
parameter values is given by:
Pr[di = (j, l)|Hi,νi,X, δ,θ]
=





k=m+1 exp[δk + µik + δm + µim + α log(yi − pk − pm) + Γ(k,m)]
, (4)
where H i = (z, yi), X = {xj, pj}Jj=1, and θ is the set of parameters. Moreover, let s̃ij







exp[δj + µij + δl + µil + α log(yi − pj − pl) + Γ(j, l;zi)], (5)
where Fi is defined as the denominator of equation (4).
2.2 Firm Behavior





(pj −mcj)Msj(p;x,θ, τ ),
8Notice that this s̃ij can be one at its maximum, because each household purchases more than one




′ + ωj, (6)
where Ff is the set of products produced by firm f , mcj denotes the cost function of product
j, M denotes the market size, sj(p;x,θ) denotes the market share for product j, ψ denotes
the cost parameters for the product characteristics, and ωj represents the unobservable cost
factors. This formulation is able to capture not only the strategic interaction among firms,
but also the pricing strategy within a single firm. Due to the fact that there are only
seven manufacturers in the Japanese automobile market, it is natural to assume that their
price setting behaviors are affected by other firms’ strategies. Moreover, all firms produce
multiple products. Thus, when setting prices, the firms need to consider not only other
firms’ strategies, but also the effect of their own pricing strategies on other products they
produce.
Taking the first order condition with respect to pj, we can obtain the following Bertrand-
Nash equilibrium condition;







where Dj(p; τ ) = Ms
p
j(p;x,θτ ).
9 The first order conditions can be written in the following
matrix form;
D(p; τ ) +∆(p−mc) = 0,
where D, p, and mc represent vectors of demand, price, marginal cost, and ∆ denotes a





, if k and m are produced by the same firm,
0, otherwise.
Notice that the price elasticities are different from single-choice models, given the portfolio
effects.10 Furthermore, the system of first order conditions can be solved for the vector of
9This equilibrium condition (7) is useful in the counterfactual analyses, when I find the Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium under new price vectors.
10See own and cross price elasticities summaried in Section 3.
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the marginal costs, mc, i.e.,
mc = p−∆−1D(p; τ ). (8)
3 Estimation and Identification
Given the unobservable term ξ in the utility function, I apply the strategy developed by Berry
(1994) and commonly used in other papers such as Berry et al. (1995) and Petrin (2002).
Although Berry et al. (1995) uses only macro-level market share data, I have both micro-
level decision data and macro-level market share data. In this situation, as Petrin (2002)
developed and Berry et al. (2004) applied, I construct the GMM objective function from
both micro- and macro-level data as moment conditions.11 Intuitively, I minimize the set of
moment conditions from micro-level data subject to the moment conditions from macro-level
data being equal to zero. In particular, given a set of parameter values, I match the macro
market share for each product by changing the mean utilities, δ, in the first stage. Then,
after matching the market shares, I evaluate the other moments using the set of parameter
values and the mean utilities, which together satisfy the moment conditions for the macro
data.
3.1 Estimation
I estimate the parameters, θ = (α, {β̄m,βom, βum}Mm=1, {ζr, {γrl}Ll=1}Rr=1,ψ), by matching four
“sets” of predicted moments to their data analogues: (i) the market share of each product;
(ii) the covariance between the observed consumer attributes zpi and the observed product
characteristics xj chosen by the households that purchase only one automobile; (iii) the
covariance between the observed product characteristics of two automobiles for those house-
holds purchasing two automobiles; and (iv) the first order conditions from the Bertrand-Nash
equilibrium condition. In this section, I define these sets of moments, explaining the algo-
rithm and procedure of my estimation.
3.1.1 Macro Market Share
The first set of moments, the market shares of the J products, can be derived by the following
procedure. Let w denote the vector of observed and unobserved individual heterogeneity,
i.e., w = (zi,νi, εi, ). Moreover, let Pw denote the distribution of w in the population.
11The theoretical background is given by Imbens and Lancaster (1994).
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Then, given an initial guess of mean utilities, δ0, and a set of parameters, θ, the model








[ui,(k,m)] = ui,(j,l) for j ≤ l}.
This expression means that the demand for product j is generated by households who pur-
chase product j. In order to obtain this market share vector, the joint distribution of house-
hold demographic characteristics is needed. I use survey data from KHPS to calculate this
joint distribution, relying on the representativeness of KHPS.12 I sum up choice probabilities
for each simulated household’s to obtain the theoretical market share. In other words, I











Pr[di = (j, l)|H i,νi,X, δ(θ)]
}
,
where N represents the number of households. The choice probabilities are given by equation
(4) in the previous section. The reason why I divide the sum of probabilities by 2 is that each
household can purchase up to two automobiles. Here, I define the ‘zeroth’ set of moments
by taking the difference between empirical and predicted market shares for each product j:
G0j(θ) = sj − s
p
j(δ(θ)), (9)
where sj denotes the empirical market share, and G
0 = [G01(θ), · · · , G0J(θ)]′. After obtaining
the predicted market shares, I utilize the contraction mapping method developed by Berry
et al. (1995).13 Until the difference between the predicted market shares and the empirical
market shares is small, I iterate this procedure by updating the mean utilities via:
δT+1 = δT + log(s)− log(sp(δ(θ))).
12This usage is partially due to the absence of the joint distributions of household characteristics in the
Japanese Census data.
13In this setting, the applicability of BLP-type contraction mapping is not straightforward, because the
substitutability plays an important role in making this method work. Typically, this inversion technique
requires the products being gross substitutes. In this particular application, though some products might be
complements at the individual-level, the products are gross substitutes at the market-level judging from the
market share. Thus, the inversion works in this case. See also discussion in Berry, Gandhi and Haile (2013).
12
By doing so, I can exactly match the product-level market shares, i.e., G0(θ) = 0, and obtain
the vector of mean utilities, δ∗(θ), which satisfies the first moment, given the parameter
values of θ.
3.1.2 Covariance Between Household Attributes and Product Characteristics
The second set of moments is derived from the micro data. In particular, in order to construct
this moment, I use the households that purchased exactly one automobile during the period
in the KHPS. Having obtained δ, it is straightforward to calculate the choice probabilities
for each household by using the household characteristics via equation (4). Now, I prepare
ns times of νi for each household, and integrate them out to obtain the predicted choice
probabilities for micro samples:





Pr[di = (j, l)|Zi,X, δ(θ),νki ].
After obtaining these simulated choice probabilities, I construct the covariance of the
observed consumer attributes zpi with the observed product characteristics xj which are
chosen by the households. Conceptually, it should be E[zxD−zxP ] where xD and xP denote
the product characteristics of the empirical data and model prediction, respectively. This
set of moments enables us to predict the kinds of household attributes that incline them to











(xj1{di=j} − xjPr[di = (0, j)|H i,X,θ, di1 = 0])
}]
,
where B1 denotes the set of households who purchase one automobile. Notice that the
probability is a conditional choice probability, as I know which households purchased exactly
one automobile during the period. And, these conditional choice probabilities should be given
as:
P̂r[di = (0, j)|di1 = 0] =
P̂r[di = (0, j)]∑
l∈J P̂r[di = (0, l)]
,
where every choice probability is given (H i,X, δ(θ)).
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3.1.3 Covariance Between Observed Characteristics for Two Automobiles
Next, I set the third set of moments as the covariance of the observed product charac-
teristics for two automobiles, given that the households eventually own two automobiles.
Conceptually, it should be E[xD1 x
D
2 − xP1 xP2 ], where xPl and xDl denote the l-th automobile’s













−xjxlPr[di = (j, l)|H i,νi,x,θ, δ, di1 ̸= 0]
}]
,
where B2 denotes the set of households who purchase two automobiles, and the conditional
choice probability is given by:
P̂r[di = (0, j)|di1 ̸= 0] =
P̂r[di = (j, l)]∑
k
∑
m P̂r[di = (k,m)|k ̸= 0]
.
These moment conditions are particularly important for identifying the coefficients in the
portfolio effect terms, such as γr, because these moment conditions enable us to predict
the kinds of household attributes that incline them to purchase a particular combination of
products.
3.1.4 The Berry et al. (1995) Moments
Finally, the first and the fourth sets of moments come from the orthogonality condition of
E[ξ|(X,W )] = 0 and E[ω|(X,W )] = 0. Mean utilities vector will give us ξ as:
ξ = δ∗(θ)−Xβ̂.
Similarly, the first order conditions given by equation equation (8), and the functional form
assumption of marginal cost given by equation (6) yield:
ω = log(p−∆−1D)−Xψ′.
14
Here, as previously mentioned, because of the portfolio effects, I need to compute ∆ by















α exp[δj + µij + δl + µil + α log(yi − pj − pl) + Γ(j, l; zi)]
yi − pj − pl
, (10)








α exp[δn + µin + δl + µil + α log(yi − pn − pl) + Γ(n, l; zi)]
yi − pn − pl
− 1
Fi
α exp[δj + µij + δn + µin + α log(yi − pj − pn) + Γ(n, j;zi)]
yi − pj − pn
. (11)
The economic intuition behind this complexity is as follows: In the BLP model, products are
gross substitutes, implying that an increase in price j would increase the choice probabilities
for other products. However, in this model, as equation (11) indicates, the change in price
of product n can be decomposed into two parts; (i) the choice probability of product j will
increase as the relative price of pj/pn decreases, and (ii) the choice probability of jointly
purchasing j and n will decrease as pn increases.
As a matter of convention, as sets of instruments for this set of moments, I use (i) the
average product characteristics produced by other firms, (ii) the average characteristics of
products other than j produced by the same firm, and (iii) the characteristics of product
j. I also add the number of products that firm f produces in order to identify the constant
terms in both utility and cost functions. Thus, defining Z1 and Z4 as the sets of instruments














3.1.5 The GMM Estimator




G(θ)′S−1G(θ) subject to G0(θ) = 0,
where S is a weighting matrix which is a consistent estimate of E[G(θ)G(θ)′] and
G(θ) = [G1(θ) G2(θ) G3(θ) G4(θ)]′,
where eachGm(θ), for m = 1, · · · 4, is defined above. To solve this problem, I use the method
suggested by Nevo (2001) and applied by Goeree (2008) to ease the computational burden.
Namely, the mean utilities do not depend on the parameter values of {β̄m}Mm=1, and they
only depend on α’s, {βom,βum}Mm=1 and the parameters in the portfolio effects term. Thus, I
can restrict the non-linear search to a subset of the parameters. The estimator is consistent
and asymptotically normal (Pakes and Pollard (1989)).
3.2 Identification
In order to discuss identification issue in this model, consider the following example. Suppose
there are three products, A, B, and C, and assume that A and B are regular cars, whereas
C is a minivan. The mean utility and unobserved taste for product j are denoted by δj
and νj, respectively. Moreover, assume that when purchasing two products i and j jointly,
consumers obtain an additional utility, denoted by Γ(i, j), which is unobserved:
uA = δA + νA, uAB = δA + δB + Γ(A,B) + νA + νB,
uB = δB + νB, uAC = δA + δC + Γ(A,C) + νA + νC ,














One of the difficulties of a multiple discrete choice model is separating “correlated pref-
erence” and “complementarities.” When an individual purchases products A and C, for
example, the model cannot tell whether σAC is high (correlated preference) or Γ(A,C) is
high (complementarities). Gentzkow (2007) takes advantage of the panel data structure and
decomposes unobserved preference into fixed effect terms and random utility shocks:
νj = ν̃j + εj,
which enables him to achieve identification. On the other hand, I take a different approach –
imposing categorical complementarities. In this example, A and B belong a set of regular cars
and C belongs to a set of minivans, and thus this paper assumes Γ(A,C) = Γ(B,C) = ΓRM .
This assumption leads to:
uAC = δA + δC + ΓRM + νA + νC ,
uBC = δB + δC + ΓRM + νB + νC .
From this expression it is easy to see that σAC and σBC are identified by comparing the
number of households that purchase (i) a combination of A and C, and (ii) a combination
of B and C, after controlling for individual automobile utilities. If these two numbers are
totally different, the difference should be resulted from either the difference in mean utili-
ties or the difference in correlated preference, because complementarities arising from both
combinations are identical. Thus, after controlling for individual automobile utilities, the
difference should be explained by correlated preference.
Of course, ΓRM might not be enough to explain Γ(A,C) or Γ(B,C). In other words, it
might be possible to decompose Γ(·, ·) into two parts:
Γ(A,C) = ΓRM + µAC ,
Γ(B,C) = ΓRM + µBC .
where µAC and µBC are, again, unobserved complementarities, depending on a specific com-
bination of the products. I rule out such further unobserved complementarities. However, in
this application, it is hard to imagine that the complementarities coming from (i) a Toyota
Camry (regular) and a Mazda 5 (minivan), and (ii) a Honda Accord (regular) and a Mazda




I mainly use three Japanese datasets; Keio Household Panel Survey which contains household-
level data on purchasing decisions, New Motor Vehicle Registrations which gives the aggre-
gate sales number of automobiles in a given year, and Automotive Guidebook which provides
the product-level panel data. In this section, I describe the characteristics of these datasets
and present some summary statistics.14
Keio Household Panel Survey The Keio Household Panel Survey is provided by Keio
University, a private research university in Tokyo, Japan. One of the main goals of KHPS is
to provide Japanese household-level micro panel data in order to promote empirical research
about Japan. The sample size of KHPS was approximately 4,000 households from 2004 to
2006. In terms of automobile ownership, KHPS inquired in 2004 about: (1) month and
year of purchase; (2) maker, brand, and model of each automobile; and (3) whether it was
purchased as a new car or a used car, for up to three cars. Every year since 2004, KHPS has
inquired (1) whether each household purchased automobiles or not up to two cars; and (2)
whether each household discarded automobiles or not up to two cars. I extract information
from the data gathered in 2004 to 2006.
New Motor Vehicle Registrations The New Motor Vehicle Registrations series issued
by the Japan Automobile Dealers Association provides the number of units sold for each
model in a given year under the supervision of the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Trans-
portation, and Tourism.15 Thus, this registration data can serve as empirical macro-level
market share, which is used in the “zeroth” set of moments in equation (9).
Automotive Guidebook: Micro Data for Products The Automotive Guidebook series
is issued by the Japan Automobile Manufactures Association (JAMA) every year. I construct
the product-level panel data from this series of books, since each edition provides the set
of available automobile models and the characteristics for each, such as price, interior and
14The reasons why I choose the Japanese automobile market are the following: (i) its relatively small
used car market compared to the market for brand new automobiles, and (2) its quick purchasing cycle. As
for the first reason, it enables us to ignore the used car markets, which provides close substitutes for new
automobiles, and makes the choice set for consumers bigger. As for the second reason, I will discuss later in
this section.
15As for the sales of used automobiles, it is difficult to know the exact number of automobile sales since there
are many companies which deal with used cars and it is difficult to collect and aggregate this decentralized
market information.
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exterior dimensions, seating capacity, and engine displacement. Table 1 shows the average
characteristics of automobiles sold from 2004 to 2006.
4.1 Consumer Choice Set
Domestic automobiles are dominant in Japan – about 94% of the market share is held by
domestic automobile manufacturers. Moreover, compared to Japan’s domestic automobiles,
information about foreign automobiles is misreported often in my micro data. I thereby
exclude foreign automobiles.
Second of all, like BLP, I do not use the secondary market data for this empirical exercise.
There are two reasons. First and most importantly, the secondary market is small in Japan
– more than 65% of consumers in KHPS purchase new automobiles. This popularity of new
automobiles is partially because of the costly automobile inspection system and partially
because owning old automobiles is expensive in Japan. Moreover, the total sales data for
the secondary market is not available in Japan. Compared to the sales of new cars, the
secondary market is not well monitored by the government. Even though statistics on total
automobile “trading” exist, it is hard to know how many used cars are sold/purchased. In
addition to this problem in the macro data, the micro data (KHPS), does not include details
about automobile models, nor does it include used car sale prices. Therefore, I ignore used
car purchases, because it is not possible to use the information from the macro and micro
data consistently.
To finalize the choice set, I also eliminate several discontinued domestic automobile mod-
els having annual sales of fewer than 1,000 units each during 2004-2006. This leaves 154
automobiles for this study. Also, because very few households purchased two minivans and
none of them purchased two exactly identical automobiles, I exclude the combinations of
two minivans and two identical products from the potential choice set.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
In this section, using the datasets introduced above, I summarize some descriptive statistics
for automobiles included in the choice set. Table 1 displays means, standard deviations, and
the maximum and minimum of several automobile characteristics for each category. Com-
pared to other automobiles, it is clear that kei-cars have less seating capacity, horsepower,
and polluting gas emissions, but are more fuel-efficient and affordable. Also, within the
categories of kei-car and minivan, the standard deviations for each characteristic are much
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smaller than for regular cars, because regular cars include all automobiles, except kei-cars
and minivans, i.e., the regular car category includes hatchbacks, sedans, station wagons,
sport cars, and sports utility vehicles (SUVs).
Table 2 lists all domestic automobile manufacturers included in my estimation. Table
2 also shows the number of models and aggregate sales for each category by these man-
ufacturers. The table clearly indicates that the total sales for kei-cars and minivans are
indeed substantial in Japan, accounting for about 31% and 21% of total automobile sales,
respectively. In particular, while kei-car models represent only about 20% of all considered
automobile models, the total number of kei-car sales accounts for 30% of the total automo-
bile sales, implying that each kei-car model has more sales, on average than other types of
automobiles. It is also clear that several firms, such as Mitsubishi and Suzuki, rely heavily
on kei-car production, because kei-cars represent 63% and 88% of their unit sales, respec-
tively. Mazda and Nissan, on the other hand, sold significantly fewer kei-cars. In particular,
Mazda’s kei-cars represent only 16.5% of its sales, even though Mazda produces five kei-car
models.
4.3 Data Implementation
Similar to Hendel (1999), I chose the three years from 2003 to 2005 as one decision period.
That is, as long as a household purchased automobiles within that period, I assume that the
household purchased automobiles in a decision period. Three years might not be long enough,
because some fraction of households that eventually purchase two automobiles might not
purchase both of them within the decision period. They might purchase just one automobile
within these three years and purchase another automobile later. Thus, the longer the decision
period, the better the estimation.
However, interestingly, the automobile purchase cycle of Japanese households is short.
This short cycle is because the Japanese government has implemented a costly automobile
inspection system for car owners. If a consumer purchases a new automobile, that car must
be inspected three years after purchase, and every other year after that. The cost is about
$1,000 to $2,500 USD per inspection, which could be about 8% to 20% of the average kei-car
price. Many households discard their automobiles at the end of three, five, or seven years
in order to avoid the inspection costs. Therefore, by observing their purchasing behavior
for three years, I can predict their eventual number of automobile purchases with relatively
high accuracy.
Alternatively, it might be also possible to model consumers’ utility based on their current
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automobile holdings, taking advantage of the panel structure of the data. For example,
suppose a household purchased one minivan before 2002, and one kei-car during the decision
period. An alternative way of using the data would be to estimate demand parameters
depending on the category of the current automobile, or specifying different utility functions
depending on the current automobile holdings. In that way, I might be able to take advantage
of information from the data. However, these alternative ways of modeling have endogeneity
problems. If a household expects that the government will eliminate tax subsidies for small
automobiles in the near future, they might not purchase a combination of one minivan and
one kei-car as they otherwise would. In order to avoid this issue, I do not allow utility to
vary by the current automobile holdings.
As Nevo (2000) notes, the potential market size is one of the big issues in this Berry et
al. (1995) style random coefficient model, because the potential market size is crucial for
the market share of outside options. The most common way of setting the potential market
size is to use the number of households in the market. However, in this study, I allow each
household to choose more than one alternative. Thus, I set the potential market share as the
sum of the number of single-person households, and the doubled number of multiple-person
households, i.e., 83,669,000.
5 Estimation Results
Structural Estimates Tables 3 and 4 present the demand side estimates. Table 3 displays
the parameters associated with random coefficients, while Table 4 lists the parameters in the
portfolio effect term. As one can see from these tables, most of the estimates are statistically
significant.
For the parameter estimates associated with random coefficients, I first show the coeffi-
cients for the log of the income term, log(yi − pj), which are interacted with the percentile
income. These are listed in the top three rows. As household-level income increases, α
becomes larger. Similar results can be observed in Petrin (2002). I have a larger coefficient
α for 50% to 95% percentile income households than for wealthier households. This might
be a result of dropping expensive domestic automobiles and foreign automobiles from the
choice set. The average prices for foreign automobiles are much higher than those of domes-
tic automobiles. Thus, by dropping them from the choice set, I might be underestimating
their marginal utility of automobile consumption.
The next three rows show the estimates associated with seating capacity. I include the
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family size as one of the variables for explaining the valuation of seating capacity, because a
reduced form analysis indicates that family size is one of the most important determinants
for seating capacity. Not surprisingly, the result shows that a household with more members
is more likely to purchase an automobile with larger seating capacity, showing high statistical
significance. The reason I have a relatively large standard deviation for seating capacity may
be caused by the fact that some large-family households purchase small-capacity automobiles
such as kei-cars, and vice versa. The rest of the parameters can also be interpreted in the
same way. I include the age of the household’s head as one of the variables for explaining
the valuation of horsepower. Again, not surprisingly, the result shows that a higher head-of-
household age contributes to the purchase of automobiles with higher horsepower.
The estimation results for portfolio effects are presented in Table 4. The first three
rows show the fixed effect of having two automobiles. As one might expect, the larger
the number of earners within a household, the higher the probability of purchasing two
automobiles. In Japan, cities are classified by population, and the government categorizes
them into the following three groups: the 14 biggest cities, other cities, and villages.16 The
estimation results show that households in less-populated areas are more likely to purchase
two automobiles.
According to the results, the presence of children might also be a driving force in the
purchase of at least one kei-car, because all combinations that include at least one kei-car are
higher than other combinations that do not include any kei-cars. The combination specific
unobserved terms, listed in the last five rows, show that combinations of kei-cars and minivans
create the highest portfolio effect, whereas combinations of two kei-cars give the lowest
portfolio effect. The combination of two regular cars also shows a positive portfolio effect,
because the category of regular cars includes all automobiles except kei-cars and minivans
and households might enjoy the combination of one sedan and one SUV, for example.
Finally, the estimation results on the supply side are summarized in Table 5. The nega-
tive coefficient for miles-per-gallon (MPG) may be a result of the constant returns to scale
assumption. The reason is as follows: the best selling automobiles tend to have high MPG,
and the model predicts that these best selling automobiles should have a smaller marginal
cost than they actually do by assuming the constant returns to scale. Thus, by omitting
sales or production from the model, we might underestimate the coefficient for MPG, be-
cause sales and MPG are positively correlated and marginal cost is likely decreasing in sales.
In fact, Berry et al. (1995) encounter the same problem, and solve this problem by including
16Recently, the categorization was changed because of municipal amalgamations that occurred between
2000 and 2005.
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sales data as an explanatory variable.17
Model Fit The predicted macro market shares are exactly the same as the empirical
market shares, due to the first step in the estimation procedure. Thus, I show the model
fit using my micro samples. Table 6 demonstrates the fitness of the model using data for
households purchasing one automobile in the KHPS. I calculate the probability of choosing
passenger cars with a seating capacity of 5, and sports cars, which are not directly targeted
in the estimation procedure, using the household attributes found in the micro data. The
model also predicts the average expenditure for automobiles. These numbers are reported
in the second column, while empirical probabilities and expenditures are reported in the
third column. For example, my model suggests that the choice probability for sport cars is
0.009, whereas the empirical data shows also 0.009. Predicted average expenditures can be
computed by summing up prices weighted by the choice probabilities. My model indicates
an average expenditure of $23,435, which is almost identical to the average expenditure in
the data ($23,678), when I use 1 USD is equal to 80 JPY.
Table 7 demonstrates the model fit using only the households in KHPS purchasing two
automobiles. I report the predicted average characteristics for all automobiles purchased by
these households in the second column, and empirical averages in the third column. Notice
that the average, standard error, minimum and maximum of horsepower are 134.5, 61.2,
43, and 280, respectively (from Table 1). Thus, comparing the predicted averages with the
empirical averages, I conclude the model predicts the non-targeted moments well for those
households that purchase two automobiles.
6 Counterfactual Analysis: Repealing Tax Subsidies
The estimation results show that a positive portfolio effect exists between kei-cars and mini-
vans. Thus, by ignoring a strong portfolio effect, we might have biased counterfactual anal-
yses. In this subsection, to emphasize the importance of consumers’ portfolio considerations
and potential bias in counterfactual experiments, I examine the effects of repealing the tax
subsidies for kei-cars, comparing the results from a standard single discrete choice model, i.e.,
micro-BLP. First, I describe the details of the tax subsidies for automobiles in Japan. Then
I show the results of the simulation using an estimated model with and without portfolio
considerations.
17For more detail, see Berry et al. (1995), pp.876-877.
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A: Details of Tax Subsidies
When consumers purchase automobiles in Japan, there are three types of taxes. Table 8 sum-
marizes these taxes. First, based on acquisition prices, consumers must pay an automobile
acquisition tax of 3% of the purchase price for any kei-car and 5% for any other automobile.
Second, consumers must also pay an automobile weight tax, which is $55 per year for any
kei-car, and $79 for every 0.5 tons for other automobiles. Although it seems the difference
between kei-cars and other cars is small, the Japanese government requires consumers to pay
the automobile weight tax for three years. Thus, the full cost difference is be more than $300.
Finally, depending on the engine displacement of the purchased automobile, consumers must
pay an automobile tax or kei-car tax. This tax is $90 for any kei-cars, while the automobile
tax is at least $369 for other automobiles and about $62 for every additional 500cc of engine
displacement.18
More precisely, I use the following tax structure in my estimation. The automobile
acquisition tax ratio is defined as
τ1,j =
0.03, if j’s displacement is less than 660cc,0.05, otherwise.
Second, the automobile weight tax is specified as
τ2,j =
55, if j is a kei-car,79⌊xj,1/500⌋, otherwise,
where xj,1 is the weight of automobile j measured in kilograms.
19 Finally the automobile
tax or kei-car tax, denoted by τ3,j, is $90 for any kei-cars. The automobile tax for other
cars is summarized in Table 9. In summary, if the price for automobile j is pj, consumers
eventually pay the following price;
pc(pj, τ ) = (1 + τ1,j) pj + 3τ2,j + 3τ3,j.
The reason why τ2,j and τ3,j are multiplied by 3 is that consumers must pay these taxes for
the first three years after purchase.
To show how large these tax subsidies are, Table 10 summarizes tax payment for a selected
18Detail tax scheme is summarized in Table 9.
19A definition of the floor function is ⌊x⌋ = max{n ∈ Z|n ≤ x}.
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kei-car, the Nissan MOCO, as an example. The price, displacement and weight of MOCO
are $13,054, 658cc, and 850kg, respectively, Based on this information, we can calculate the
total tax with and without these tax subsidies. I find that the difference would be more than
$1,400, which is more than 10 percent of the original price. This difference might be large
enough to change consumers’ purchasing behavior.
These tax subsidies were introduced in the 1960s to make small automobiles more af-
fordable for Japanese households that could not afford to purchase regular-size automobiles.
Later, the goal of this policy shifted to promote purchasing of eco-friendly automobiles. Re-
cently, there has been discussion over whether these tax subsidies should be repealed or not,
and those who oppose the repeal claim that the demand for kei-cars (which are eco-friendly
automobiles) would dramatically decrease. However, considering the strong positive portfo-
lio effects, this argument might not be the case. To examine the effects of repealing these
tax subsidies, I set the same tax scheme for small cars as regular automobiles.
B: Related Literature
Recent increasing environmental concerns have led to a replacement policy focusing on au-
tomobile markets. One stream of literature analyzes the policy of promoting the retirement
of old automobiles by subsidizing the scrappage of old atuomobiles or the purchase of new
automobiles, such as Adda and Cooper (2000), Alberini et al. (1995), Chen et al. (2010),
Hahn (1995), and Schiraldi (2011). Such dynamic replacement behavior is one of the critical
aspects in examining the effectiveness of a renewed policy. At the same time, however, it is
also important to take into account the portfolio considerations of consumers. For example,
a household can own one small enviromentally friendly car and one minivan, and plan to
replace the minivan with a new car. Then, even though the household can purchase small
cars at discounted prices due to the subsidies, it would not purchase one more small car be-
cause of the portfolio effect. Therefore, this empirical study complements the aforementioned
literature.
Another literature on the effects of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards
is also closely related to my paper. CAFE Standards are U.S. regulations intended to improve
automobile fuel efficiency by charging penalty fees to any automobile manufacturer having
an average fuel economy (calculated across its entire fleet) that falls below the standards.
There are many papers that analyze CAFE Standards using various approaches. These
include Austin and Dinan (2005); Bento et al. (2009); Goldberg (1998); and Gramlich (2010).
CAFE standards, in general, can be viewed as an implicit tax on large automobiles and a
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subsidy for eco-friendly small automobiles. The Japanese tax subsidies, however, create
a more direct consumer side incentive to purchase eco-friendly automobiles. Thus, this
empirical study also complements the literature.
C: Simulation Results
Aggregate-level and Brand-level Effects Table 11 summarizes by automobile category
the predicted effects of repealing tax subsidies. If subsidies were eliminated, the total demand
for kei-cars would decrease by 9.04%, and total demand for regular cars and minivans would
increase 5.02% and 1.13%, respectively. In order to compare these results to the case where
there is no portfolio effect, I also estimate the micro-BLP model using the same dataset. The
estimation results from micro-BLP model are summarized in the middle column of Table
11, and the simulation results suggest that the total demand for kei-cars (ignoring portfolio
effects) would decrease by 13.95%. Thus, this difference of about 4.9% can be accounted by
the portfolio effect.
In Table 12, I show more detailed results for some selected kei-cars. Comparing the fourth
and fifth columns (which display the percentage change in demand predicted by micro-BLP
and my model) one can see that the standard single choice model overestimates the effects
of repealing tax subsidies. Most automobiles are overestimated by 5%. Table 12 indicates
that demand for more expensive cars would tend to decrease, because consumers would
give up purchasing expensive kei-cars and would purchase relatively affordable regular cars
instead. However, those households that purchase cheap automobiles would not change their
choices, because there is no cheaper class of automobiles available. The COPEN, produced
by Daihatsu, shows an interesting pattern. Even though it is expensive, the demand would
not decrease much because the COPEN is a sport type kei-car, and there is no suitable
substitute for this automobile, while other automobiles have many competing substitutes.
There is one more interesting pattern in Table 12: the percentage changes in prices for
EVERYWAGON, WAGON R, and MRWAGON are almost zero, though other automobiles’
prices increase in micro-BLP’s prediction. These differences are largely because these three
automobiles are produced by Suzuki, which mainly produces kei-cars. As Table 2 suggests,
other manufacturers have many substitutes for kei-cars, and thus they charge higher prices
for kei-cars to shift the demand toward their other automobiles. Suzuki, however, cannot do
so.
I also display more detailed results for some selected minivans in Table 13. The micro-
BLP model predicts that demand for minivans would slightly increase, while my model
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predicts that demand for expensive minivans would decrease while demand for affordable
minivans would increase. This difference is because in the micro-BLP model, all automobiles
are substitutes and thus choice probabilities for other automobiles increase when kei-cars’
prices are increased by repealing tax subsidies. Thus, the changes in demand for minivans
decrease as the automobile prices increase. On the other hand, my model predicts that only
the demand for expensive minivans would decrease. This difference can be explained by the
fact that there are some households that highly value a combination of one kei-car and one
minivan. Those households would purchase one kei-car and one slightly cheaper minivan to
maintain their portfolios under the new tax policy. Thus, the demand for expensive minivans
would decrease. At the same time, the demand for affordable minivans would increase.
The economic intuition behind these results is also confirmed by Figures 1 and 2. In
Figure 1, I show the simulated changes in units sold from micro-BLP model and my model,
depending on engine displacement. It is clear that the demand for kei-cars decreases sharply
in both my model and micro-BLP model, while the demand for other automobiles increases
in both models. In particular, as automobiles’ engine displacement increases, the change gets
smaller. Moreover, I decompose these results for regular cars and minivans, and show the
results for minivans in Figure 2. Again, it can be confirmed that the demand for expensive
minivans would decrease slightly, while the demand for affordable minivans would increase.
Fuel Consumption and Environmental Implication Policy makers might be inter-
ested in the environmental implications of this repeal of tax subsidies. Thus, I calculate
an index, commonly known as Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) Standards in the






where nj and ej denote the sales and fuel efficiency of automobile j, respectively. As men-
tioned in the previous section, CAFE Standards are intended to improve average automobile
fuel efficiency by charging penalty fees to automobile producers when this index of their an-
nual fleet of automobile sales falls below a certain number. Thus, if this index decreases by
repealing tax subsidies, it implies that the repeal promotes the purchasing of less fuel-efficient
automobiles.
The results summarized in Table 14 show that in both models the CAFE Standards de-
crease slightly. This overall small impact is because many households will purchase compact
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cars, close substitutes for kei-cars which are almost as fuel efficient as kei-cars, after elimi-
nating tax subsidies. Thus, the effect of eliminating tax subsidies is quite limited. The small
difference between two models might be explained by the same logic as before; some house-
holds might purchase affordable minivans under the new policy, giving up purchasing huge
minivans, whereas this cannot happen in the micro-BLP model. However, notice that this
index cannot reflect the actual number of automobiles sold. As Table 11 suggests, the total
number of automobiles decreases more in the micro-BLP model. Therefore, even though
this CAFE Standards index decreases more in the micro-BLP model, it does not neccessary
mean that the total environmental implications is worse in the micro-BLP model.
Effects on Producer In Table 15, I show the simulated profits for automobile manufac-
turers in Japan. Repealing the tax subsidies would cause lower profits for four out of seven
manufacturers, because those four firms rely heavily on profits from kei-cars. The other
firms, however, would achieve higher profits. One of the firms, Nissan, would increase its
profit by 3.87%, as Nissan produces only one model of kei-car among its 27 models. Mazda
would also have higher profits, even though it produces five models of kei-car. This large
increase is because Mazda’s kei-cars are not its best-selling automobiles, and its total sales
of kei-cars account for only 16.5% of its profit, as seen in Table 2.
Welfare Implication Finally, Table 16 presents the changes in consumer surplus, pro-
ducer surplus, and tax revenue. The results show that repealing tax subsidies would force
consumers to spend their money for purchasing automobiles, and thus their surplus would
decrease remarkably. Although the profits of Suzuki, one of the most famous manufacturers
producing kei-cars, would decrease by 7.2%, total producer surplus would remain nearly the
same, as mentioned above. Lastly, tax revenue for the Japanese government would increase,
because repealing tax subsidies implies that the government keeps more money. Moreover,
raising tax rates causes social welfare to decrease, and creates a dead-weight loss.
7 Conclusion
This paper develops a structural model which accounts for the portfolio effect, building upon
the previous papers by BLP and Gentzkow (2007). I estimate the model using a unique set
of Japanese household-level data on automobile purchases to examine the role these portfolio
effects play. My estimates suggest that positive portfolio effects exist between kei-cars and
minivans. Ignoring such portfolio effects might lead to a biased counterfactual analysis. In
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particular, I conduct a counterfactual experiment where the Japanese government repeals
current tax subsidies for kei-cars. The portfolio-BLP model suggests that a repeal of the
current tax subsidies for small automobiles would decrease the demand for small automobiles
by 9%, which is smaller than the 14% drop predicted by a standard discrete choice model, i.e.,
the micro-BLP model. The simulation results from the portfolio-BLP model also show that
the demand for expensive minivans would decrease and the demand for affordable minivans
would increase, whereas the demand for all automobiles except kei-cars would increase in
the micro-BLP model.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Product Characteristics for Each Category
Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max
Capacity (person)
Kei-car 31 3.87 0.50 2 4
Regular 94 5.09 1.04 2 8
Minivan 29 7.27 0.65 6 8
All 154 5.25 1.40 2 8
Fuel Efficiency (km/l)
Kei-car 31 16.4 2.22 10 22
Regular 94 12.9 3.88 6 30
Minivan 29 12.2 2.82 7 19
All 154 13.5 3.72 6 30
Horsepower (PS/rpm)
Kei-car 31 57.6 4.99 43 67
Regular 94 154.6 57.9 76 280
Minivan 29 151.6 33.5 86 240
All 154 134.5 61.2 43 280
Displacement (cc)
Kei-car 31 658 0.85 656 659
Regular 94 2068 720.2 1,096 4,494
Minivan 29 2130 495.2 1,297 3,498
All 154 1797 829.0 656 4,494
Price ($)
Kei-car 31 14,487 2,125 10,643 18,725
Regular 94 28,265 10,778 12,250 57,125
Minivan 29 29,760 7,813 17,130 46,943
All 154 25,741 10,733 10,643 57,125
Note: For each product characteristic and each automobile category,
I report the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum. For
price calculation, I use the following exchange rate: $1.00 = ¥ 80.0.
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Table 2: List of Automobile Makers and Product Lineups
Number of models Units sold (Q)
Manufacturers Kei-car Regular Minivan Kei-car Regular Minivan
Daihatsu/Toyota 8 44 11 1,173,235 2,924,224 1,372,277
(12.7%) (69.8%) (17.5%) (21.4%) (53.5%) (25.1%)
Honda 3 8 6 652,333 763,918 688,781
(17.6%) (47.1%) (35.3%) (31.0%) (36.3%) (32.7%)
Mazda 5 8 3 112,458 410,603 157,422
(31.3%) (50.0%) (18.8%) (16.5%) (60.3%) (23.1%)
Mitsubishi 4 5 3 430,059 198,724 56,752
(33.3%) (41.7%) (25.0%) (62.7%) (29.0%) (8.3%)
Nissan 1 21 5 133,389 1,485,896 380,199
(3.7%) (77.8%) (18.5%) (6.7%) (74.3%) (19.0%)
Subaru 3 3 0 194,459 267,932 0
(50.0%) (50.0%) (0.0%) (42.1%) (57.9%) (0.0%)
Suzuki 7 5 1 1,246,095 165,258 4,784
(53.8%) (38.5%) (7.7%) (88.0%) (11.7%) (0.3%)
Total 31 94 29 3,942,028 6,216,555 1,372,277
(20.1%) (61.0%) (18.8%) (30.8%) (48.5%) (20.8%)
Note: The first three columns show the number of products which fall into each category for each
firm. The next three columns show the total sales of products in each category. The numbers in
parentheses display the percentage of models and units sold for each category within a firm.
Table 3: Estimated Parameters of the Demand Sides
Micro-BLP Portfolio-BLP
Product Characteristics Estimates Std. Err. Estimates Std. Err.
Term on Price (α)
Income ≤ 50 percentile (α1) 16.71∗∗ 6.013 12.59∗∗ 3.70
Income ∈ [50,90] (α2) 68.61∗∗ 4.163 65.12∗∗ 1.41
Income ≥ 90 percentile (α3) 76.89∗∗ 4.504 59.52∗∗ 9.40
Constant Term
Mean (β̄1) -130.2
∗∗ 18.17 -132.5∗∗ 7.92




∗∗ 1.082 5.170∗∗ 0.412
Family Size (βo2,1) 0.615
∗∗ 0.218 0.791∗∗ 0.100
Std. Deviation (βu2 ) 0.191 0.392 0.360 0.347
Miles Per Gallon
Mean (β̄3) -6.18
∗∗ 0.493 -0.317 0.199
Std. Deviation (βu3 ) 0.469 0.225 0.043 0.044
log(HP/Weight)
Mean (β̄4) 9.200
∗∗ 1.379 7.694∗∗ 0.382
Age of Household Head (βo4,1) 0.023 0.015 3.46E-04
∗∗ 0.000
Std. Deviation (βu4 ) 0.261
∗∗ 0.050 0.013∗∗ 0.004
Note: For horsepower and weight of automobiles, I use logarithms. ** and * indicate 95% and
90% level of significance, respectively.
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Table 4: Estimated Parameters for Portfolio Term
Std.
Estimates Err.
Fixed effect of having two cars
Number of earners 1.377∗∗ 0.085
City dummy 1.494∗∗ 0.308
Village dummy 2.305∗∗ 0.159












Note: The first three rows display the variables included in the fixed effect
of having two automobiles (γr is the same for all categories). The next five
rows display the interaction terms between combinations of automobiles and
the presence of children. The last five rows display the estimation results for
combination specific unobserved terms. ** and * indicate 95% and 90% level
of significance, respectively.
Table 5: Estimates for Supply Side Parameters
Micro-BLP Portfolio-BLP
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Constant 14.52∗∗ 0.055 14.81∗∗ 0.014
Miles Per Gallon -2.447∗∗ 0.084 -4.003∗∗ 0.019
Horsepower/Weight 1.348∗∗ 0.030 1.129∗∗ 0.041
Toyota Dummy -0.065∗∗ 0.020 -0.031∗∗ 0.011
Note: ** and * indicate 95% and 90% level of significance, respectively.
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Table 6: Model Fit 1 - Households Purchasing One Automobile
All Samples
Predicted Data
Probability of choosing a 5-passengers car 0.398 0.392
Probability of choosing a sports car 0.009 0.009
Average Expenditure ($) 23,435 23,678
Note: ‘All samples’ means that I include all households that purchased one automobile during the
decision period. Probabilities of choosing particular categories of automobiles are aggregated with
the probabilities of choosing each automobile that falls into the category. Average expenditures are
calculated by summing up prices weighted by choice probabilities.
Table 7: Model Fit 2 - Households Purchasing Two Automobiles
Predicted Data
Average Capacity 5.310 5.313
Average MPG 14.29 14.52
Average Horsepower 97.28 97.86
Note: Average characteristics were computed by summing up characteristics for all automobiles
weighted by choice probabilities.
Table 8: List of Taxes Associated with Automobile Purchases
Kei-cars Full-size cars
(i) Automobile Acquisition Tax 3% of acquisition price 5% of acquisition price
(ii) Automobile Weight Tax ¥ 4,400 ($55.00) ¥ 6,300/500kg ($78.75/0.5t)
(iii) Automobile/Kei-car Tax ¥ 7,200 ($90.00) See Table 9
Note: Listed costs for automobile weight tax and automobile/kei-car tax are annual rates, and con-
sumers are required to pay these taxes for three years. I use the following exchange rate: $1.00 = ¥
80.
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Table 9: Annual Automobile Tax
Displacement (cc) Fee ($)









more than 6000 1,375
Note: I use the following exchange rate: $1.00 = ¥
80.
Table 10: Example of Tax Subsidies for a Selected Kei-car, MOCO
With Tax Subsidies Without Tax Subsidies
Original Price $13,054 $13,054
Tax
Acquisition Tax $392 $653
Automobile Weight Tax $165 $473
Automobile/Kei-car Tax $270 $1,106
Tax sub-total $827 $2,232
Note: MOCO is produced by Nissan. MOCO’s engine displacement is 658cc and its weight is 850kg.
Because automobile weight tax must be paid for three years, I multiply the numbers by three. Al-
though the automobile/kei-car tax must be paid annually, most Japanese households do not discard
an automobile within three years, thus I also multiplied them by three. For prices, I use the following
exchange rate: $1.00 = ¥ 80.
Table 11: Tax Elimination Effect on Automobile Sales
Micro-BLP P-BLP
Current (w/o P.E.) (w P.E.)
Sales After % After %
Kei-cars 3,942,028 3,392,034 -13.95 3,585,812 -9.04
Regular 6,216,555 6,693,223 7.67 6,528,402 5.02
Minivan 2,660,215 2,699,055 1.46 2,690,298 1.13
Total 12,818,798 12,784,312 -0.27 12,804,512 -0.11
Note: The third and fifth columns show the total units sold for each category after repealing tax
subsidies as predicted by Micro-BLP and the Portfolio BLP, respectively. The fourth and sixth
columns show the % changes from the current sales to the predicted sales.
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Table 14: Tax Elimination Effect on CAFE Standards
Current After Repealing
CAFE Standards Micro-BLP Portfolio-BLP
32.551 32.488 (-0.194%) 32.500 (-0.157%)
Table 15: Tax Elimination Effect on Producer Surplus
Profit Product Lineup
Before After % Kei Reg. Mini.
Daihatsu/Toyota 73,723 74,294 +0.76 8 44 11
Honda 21,196 21,083 −0.53 3 8 6
Mazda 6,238 6,352 +1.83 5 8 3
Mitsubishi 6,592 6,288 −4.62 4 5 3
Nissan 20,217 20,720 +2.49 1 21 5
Subaru 4,188 4,089 −2.35 3 3 0
Suzuki 15,347 14,242 −7.20 7 5 1
Total 147,510 147,068 −0.30 31 94 29
Note: The second and third columns show the estimated profits under the current tax policy, and the
simulated profits under the new tax policy where there are no tax subsidies for kei-cars. The fourth
column displays the percentage change for firms’ profit. The remaining columns show the number of
models that each manufacturer produces. Profit figures are measured in millions of dollars, and I use
the following exchange rate: $1.00 = ¥ 80.




Note: For consumer surplus, I use compensation variations (CV). Figures are ex-
pressed in millions of dollars, and I use the following exchange rate: $1.00 = ¥ 80.
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Appendix (Not for Publication)
A1: Computational Details
In this technical appendix section, I explain the simulation and estimation procedure.
1. Prepare random draws, which do not change throughout estimation, for the macro
moment and the micro moments, G2 and G3.
(a) Draw i = 1, · · · , nM consumers from the joint distribution of characteristics given
by the Census data, FM1(z). And, we also need to draw corresponding unobserved
consumer characteristics from multivariate normal distribution, FM2(ν).
(b) For each consumer i = 1, · · · , nm in KHPS, draw ns times from multivariate
normal distribution, Fm(ν) of unobserved consumer characteristics vector.
2. Choose an initial guess of parameters, θ0.
3. Calculate the predicted market share for each product, sPj , by summing up choice prob-
abilities for each consumer i = 1, · · · , nM . Using the contraction mapping developed
by Berry et al. (1995),
δt+1j = δ
t
j + ln(sj)− ln(sPj (θ)),
iterate until the difference between the predicted market share and the empirical market
share is small. This step enables us to find a vector of the mean utilities, δ∗j (θ0), which
satisfies the first moment being equal to zero, i.e., G0(θ0) = 0.
4. Find the objective value by calculating the following three moments:
(a) For each consumer in KHPS, calculate the average choice probabilities for each







which is the approximated choice probabilities of product j for each household i.
It is straightforward to calculate the moment conditions G2(θ) and G3(θ).
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Given this ∆, we can compute the inverse matrix, which enables us to obtain the
firms’ first order conditions, i.e., G4(θ).
5. Go back to step 2, until the objective function is minimized.
A2: Standard Errors
The asymptotic variance of
√











and Gj is the j-th element defined in the previous section. The variance-covariance of the
parameters can be decomposed into two parts: (i) the derivative matrix of the first order
conditions evaluated at the true parameter values, Γ̂ in (12), and (ii) the variance-covariance
of the first order conditions evaluated at the true parameter values, V̂ in (12), as shown
in Hansen (1982). As for (1), it can be consistently estimated by taking the derivative of
the sample moment’s first order condition, Γ̂, explained above. As for (2), there are three
sources of randomness: (i) the standard GMM variance term given by V̂ 1 = S(θ̂), (ii)
the difference between observed market shares and true market shares which is zero in my
case, i.e., V̂ 2 = 0, and (iii) simulation error in my calculations. The variance term due to






















where P hns is independently redrawn H times. These three randomness factors are indepen-
dent of each other, and thus V̂ will be the sum of these three V̂ i, for i = 1, 2, 3.
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